



# STUDY GUIDE



# 1991 CRISIS



## 15-17 FEBRUARY 2019

## Welcome Address

The dais of the Singapore Cabinet Crisis committee bids you a warm welcome to Nanyang Technological University Model United Nations 2019.

Despite the relative peace and stability Singapore has enjoyed over the first half century of its young existence, there have been many episodes of crises that were dealt with appropriately along with a healthy amount of good fortune, which steered away these potential conflicts from any military or violent confrontation. With the recent episode of territorial dispute between Singapore and Malaysia, we are once again reminded the fragility of peace and stability.

In this committee, the dais expects delegates to understand the many nuances of national security and bilateral relations in navigating through this perilous episode of tension and potential conflict. We hope to invoke in delegates a mature and considered mind-set of important decision making and problem solving that will be required to de-escalate this particular crisis.

The dais wishes all delegates the very best in your preparation for the conference. Should you have queries, please feel free to contact us and we will do our best to assist you. We really look forward to meeting all of you in February.

Best Regards,

The Dais, Singapore Cabinet Crisis Committee

Nanyang Technological University Model United Nations 2019

## Chairpersons Introduction

### Crisis Director: Joshua Leo Tan

As a freshman in NTU studying Economics and Public Policy and Global Affairs, Joshua enjoys the struggle of trying to comprehend the strange world we live in. His biggest hope is that the delegates attending the conference seize the opportunity to engage with like minded individuals and forge strong relationships that'll last. When he isn't trying to not drop out of school, he enjoys nothing better than a good book in the day and a good drink after dark.

### Deputy Crisis Director: Caleb Nathaniel Karim

Despite being enrolled into Engineering in the National University of Singapore, Caleb has a strong interest in all affairs pertaining to history and current affairs. Having been to several conferences in various capacities, Caleb still enjoys crisis for its ability to explore various issues through the lens of the individuals involved, so as to better appreciate the thoughts, rationales and feelings of these people as they go through history. In his free time, he enjoys contemplating on various systematic and political issues, conquering the world in Europa Universalis IV, and more recently picking up funkstyle dance.

### Head Chairperson: Wong Jun Hao

As a student of Public Policy and Global Affairs in NTU, Jun Hao believes strongly in the need to understand the world around us and the discourse of current affairs. He hopes



that delegates will come in with the right attitude to learn and to participate to the best of their abilities. While he is not arguing loudly and obnoxiously about all the problems in the world in class or along the corridors, he enjoys advocating for a greener future and the beautiful language of Chinese.

### **Assistant Chairperson: Nigel Li**

More than often, Nigel finds himself contemplating the morality of collectivism and individualism while counting down the days till he finishes his National Service. Graduating from the Singapore American School in 2017, he remains committed to MUN and hopes to bridge the gap between local and international school MUN communities. When not discussing or reading on worldly affairs, Nigel enjoys playing the piano (particularly Chopin pieces), singing while strumming the guitar, and romanticizing about China's Republican Era.

### **Assistant Chairperson: Lim Jia Rong**

Currently a sergeant in the Singapore Combat Engineers, Jia Rong balances his time between deepening his esoteric knowledge of military history and playing with plastic explosives out in the field. Having attended, chaired and organised over a dozen conferences in the past three years, he remains immensely passionate about MUN and convinced of its effectiveness in raising awareness and understanding of global issues. He is also all too familiar with the woes of being a delegate (falling asleep, bloc politics

etc.), and will gladly offer a high five if you're feeling low. Jia Rong is an alumnus of Victoria Junior College's Humanities Scholarship Programme, and enjoys Chinese tea, photography, alcohol and eighties Bosnian rock.

## Introduction to Committee: Singapore Cabinet Crisis


As a former British colony, Singapore uses the Westminster model of government, which divides the government into three main branches- Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. The Legislature is the Parliament, where laws are made. The Judiciary comprises the courts where laws are interpreted. The Cabinet, which is the Executive branch, decides on all policies and manages the affairs of the entire country. In a unicameral system, there is only one house, and the leader of the political party with a majority in Parliament will be appointed the Prime Minister, which is the Head of the State.<sup>1</sup>

The Cabinet of Singapore is the highest executive body in Singapore. It is in charge of all policies and affairs of government. The Cabinet of Singapore is comprised of all Ministers representing the various Ministries. The Cabinet is tasked with executing the daily duties and functions of government including defending the sovereignty of the Republic.

The Committee simulated in this conference is a Special Cabinet Session, extending beyond merely just the cabinet. It comprises key appointment holders in government whose portfolios are highly relevant in the resolution of defence-related crises. Including these portfolios encapsulates the various pillars of Singapore's Total Defence.

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<sup>1</sup>Singapore, P. o. (n.d.). System of Government . Retrieved from Parliament of Singapore: <https://www.parliament.gov.sg/about-us/structure/system-of-government>



*Above: a poster from the 1990s as part of the Total Defence initiative. Total Defence was launched in 1984, with the idea of defending Singapore on all fronts: economic, social, military, civil, and psychological defence.<sup>2</sup>*

Given the historical nature of this crisis, the use of electronics is prohibited, **with the exception of drafting council directives. All other submissions of directives are to be made in notepaper directed to backroom. In addition, due to the secretive nature of the crisis, there will be no tumblr newsfeed update.**

<sup>2</sup>Division, P. S. (2015). SECURING SINGAPORE: FROM VULNERABILITY TO SELF-RELIANCE. Retrieved from Public Service Division: <https://www.psd.gov.sg/heartofpublicservice/our-institutions/securing-singapore-from-vulnerability-to-self-reliance/>





**EMERGENCY CABINET BRIEF 01 08 1991****PREPARED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE****MESSAGE CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET****REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE, 01 AUGUST 1991**

On 29 July 1991, our intelligence community became aware of the conducting of an exercise codename Malindo Darsasa 3AB in Southern Johor.<sup>3</sup>

The military exercise was staged from PULADA ('Pusat Latihan Tempur Tentera Darat' or 'Army Combat Training Centre') Camp, 20 kilometers north of the causeway. While we have determined that the initial exercise was just a Command Post exercise (involving no troop movement), there exists a possibility for an expansion of the exercise to incorporate elements of troop movement as well.

In particular, the exercise, codenamed Operation Pukul Habis<sup>4</sup>, comes at a time when our government is undergoing a change of leadership. As such, at the behest of

<sup>3</sup> Boey, D. (2008, July 1). A strong and silent keeper of the peace. Retrieved from AsiaOne: <http://www.asiaone.com/News/the%2BStraits%2BTimes/Story/A1Story20080701-73867.html>

<sup>4</sup> The phrase translates to "total wipeout" from the Malay language.

the Prime Minister and President, the cabinet has been convened for an emergency meeting to respond to this possible provocation.

**The Cabinet will meet and discuss these matters on 02/08/91.** Additionally, we have provided a quick dossier to catch ministers and officers up to speed with the situation.

### **PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE (PMO)**

## NOTES ON DOMESTIC SITUATION

### PREPARED BY PMO

#### Leadership Change



Picture: Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew<sup>5</sup>

PMO notes that the exercise and timing of Malaysian-Indonesian military exercise is not coincidental. We have just undergone the first transfer of power between PM (now Senior Minister -- SM) Lee and PM Goh. Any action by our regional neighbours can be viewed as a challenge to 'test' the new leadership, hence, special consideration as to the intentions and timing of the exercise should be made.

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<sup>5</sup>Han, F., Fernandez, W., & Tan, S. (2015, March 29). Remembering Lee Kuan Yew: 'I did my best'. Retrieved from The Straits Times: <https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/remembering-lee-kuan-yew-i-did-my-best>

## Handing the Reins of Singapore to a Younger Generation



*Above: Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong is sworn into office<sup>6</sup>*

*On 28th November 1990, PM Lee Kuan Yew, our Prime Minister since Singapore's independence, stepped down from his position of Prime Minister after almost three decades governing our city state. Despite his successful governance of our state, Lee Kuan Yew had voluntarily stepped down, an unprecedented move at that time, citing the need for leadership renewal. While Lee Kuan Yew was known for his pragmatic and aggressive push for our interest both internally and abroad, there are still doubts about PM Goh Chok Tong, who will have to exercise his position as the incoming Prime Minister. SM Lee has on multiple times noted that PM Goh was not his first choice for successor.*

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<sup>6</sup>Au-Yong, R. (2016, September 4). How the 2nd and 3rd PMs were chosen. Retrieved from The Straits Times: <https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/how-the-2nd-and-3rd-pms-were-chosen>



### Incoming General Election

PMO notes that PM, on the [REDACTED] 1991, met the President and advised the President to issue the writ of election. Hence, PMO notes that the timing of the exercise and the elections could be a demonstration of a possible information leak. PMO cannot determine if this is true, but it should remain a possibility.

### Operation Lalang

PMO reminds cabinet members that on 27th October 1987, Malaysia had conducted a large scale operation reported as an attempt to crackdown on racial riots through the use of Malaysia's Internal Security Act.

However, the official rationale for this operation was placed under scrutiny in Malaysian public discourse, with some accusing the Prime Minister, Tun Dr Mahathir, for using the operation as an attempt to suppress his political opposition. SM Lee has advised us to include a note that Tun Dr Mahathir might attempt to engage in similar politically-motivated actions to buttress his standing in the domestic sphere.

## NOTES ON ECONOMIC SITUATION

### Singapore's Economic Progress as a Nation

This year Singapore experienced tremendous economic growth; our Gross Domestic Product increased by 6.7% to US\$45.473 billion, and we surpassed the “Developed Country” benchmark of US\$12, 000 per capita. Having recently come out of our first post-independence recession in 1985, structural reforms such as privatisation and deregulation have allowed the private sector to flourish. Our economy remains heavily dependent on trade, value-added manufacturing (centered around electronics and chemicals) and tourism (5,414,414 arrivals).<sup>7</sup>

Members of the cabinet should be familiar with our economic situation, especially our tremendous progress since our early days of independence. That being said, we remain dangerously reliant on external economic influxes, hence any instability stemming from the exercise (and our potential response to it) could hurt our economy.

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<sup>7</sup>Sim, W. (2016, January 10). Growth years (1981-1990): A recession, political changes and drive for excellence. Retrieved from The Straits Times: <https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/growth-years-1981-1990-a-recession-political-changes-and-drive-for-excellence>

## MILITARY BRIEF



Pictured: A National Day Parade Mobile Column at the recent National Day Parade<sup>8</sup>

Given our sudden independence, Singapore has had little for its defence, with the United Kingdom providing the only security for the island nation until 1971.

Dr. Goh Keng Swee, then Minister for Defence, implemented mandatory conscription of Singapore's male population, leading to a rapid increase in available manpower that has helped to ensure basic security and defence of the nation after British withdrawal.

In addition, we pursued (at the time) clandestine military and diplomatic ties with Israel. While the establishment of any diplomatic ties with Israel could have resulted in

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<sup>8</sup>SGTV50. (n.d.). NDP Over The Years. Retrieved from SGTV50: <https://sgtv50.wordpress.com/ndp-over-the-years/>

outbursts from both Indonesia and Malaysia, Singapore was forced to approach the Israeli after failing to secure partnerships with other major non-aligned nations at that time, such as Egypt and India. As some of you will recall, our invitation to Mr Chaim Herzog of Israel resulted in complaints and anger from our neighbours.<sup>9</sup>


While PMO notes that since the fall of the Soviet Union, we are no longer concerned by the Communist states of the region, it should also be noted that our situation results in us *appearing* to be at arm's length of the superpowers. As the region's future, especially with a rising China, remains inconclusive.



*Pictured: The Cabinet should take note of recent developments into our new Bionix IFV -  
- unfortunately, PMO understands from [REDACTED] that the Bionix IFV is unable to be  
deployed yet.*

<sup>9</sup>The Straits Times. (1986, November 19). KL calls in envoy to express regret. Retrieved from NewspaperSG: <http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19861119-1.2.24.2>





Over time, as our economy developed, we have invested more in Singapore's military, which focused mostly on improving the technology and equipment of our armed forces in order to bolster our fighting strength, given our relatively smaller military force.

### REGIONAL & GLOBAL BRIEF

As a show of our pragmatism and intention to be a friendly neighbour, Singapore has willingly extended offers to collaborate with Malaysia and Indonesia, often with mixed success. There were several reasons for Singapore to be able to succeed.<sup>10</sup>

Since the 1960s, the military landscape of our region has changed. Therefore, any offensive military actions would have been risky at best and disruptive at worst, with the potential to plunge the region into total chaos if not carefully managed. As such, foreign activities would often result in heated exchanges that did not escalate into military actions.

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<sup>10</sup>Huxley, T. (2004). Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore. Crows Nest, N.S.W. : Allen & Unwin, c2000.



Pictured: SM (then-PM) Lee speaking to a joint-session of Congress in 1985

Another factor encouraging the willingness to engage in multilateral cooperation is a shared perceived threat of domination by superpowers. Our region's history is one marked by foreign dominance and colonisation, from imperial Chinese tributary and punitive expeditions to Western conquest. As such, our commitment by the three states to keep South East Asia a neutral zone would eventually lay the foundation for the development of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

It was through the willingness of cooperation and collaborative action that Singapore was able to slowly build healthy relations with its neighbours, eventually leading to its normalisation.

## BRIEF ON INDONESIAN-SINGAPOREAN RELATIONS

As some of the younger cabinet members might remember, from 1963 to 1966, *Konfrontasi* was an intermittent armed conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia. Indonesia initiated the conflict in response to the formation of the Federation of Malaysia (Singapore, of course, was part of the Federation at the time), marking a period of social strife, subversion, instability, and loss of life.

By 1964, the escalation of conflict between the two countries prompted open cross-border military attacks in Sabah and Sarawak. In Singapore, two Indonesian marine commandos were responsible for the MacDonald House bombing which killed three people and injured 33, the attack was part of Indonesia's campaign to create instability in the Federation, in order to annex Malaysia into Sukarno's Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia).

The two attackers were hanged in 1968, while their sacrifices were celebrated back in Indonesia. Their deaths also sparked outrage in Indonesia, with Indonesian citizens storming our embassy in Jakarta.<sup>11 12</sup>

Another approach Indonesia took to destabilize our Republic was through disrupting our trade. In 1964, Singapore lost nearly 24% of Indonesian trade, as Ministry of Trade reported at the time, because the conflict disincentivized many potential

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<sup>11</sup> The Straits Times. (1965, March 14). Bank bomb blast: Two held at sea. Retrieved from NewspaperSG: <http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19650314-1.2.8>

<sup>12</sup> Hwang, T. (1965, October 7). Indons not in uniform, says judge. Retrieved from NewspaperSG: <http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19651007-1.2.21>

investors. It has also been reported that Indonesian agents instigated the racial riots of the 4th of September 1964.<sup>13</sup>

For years, since the MacDonald House bombing, our ties with Indonesia were for the most part frosty. There was some level of economic cooperation that took place given the close proximity of the two nations, but there was still palpable tension that something could indeed break out anytime.<sup>14</sup>

### *Clashing National Interests and Common Threats*

With the rise of Suharto in 1968, Konfrontasi had ended as Indonesia shifted away from its focus on expansion and towards economic recovery and domestic security. However, that did not necessarily mean the normalisation of relations between Singapore and Indonesia, for there were also conflicts in the diplomatic sphere over various issues.


In 1972, Indonesia had pushed for control over the Straits of Malacca, while Singapore reiterated that it was willing to cooperate with Indonesia and Malaysia with regards to the management of the Straits of Malacca, provided it was international waters.<sup>15</sup> These conflicts further highlighted the differences in opinions with respect to how each side viewed the other. Singapore hoped to see both nations view each other as equals and was willing to support Indonesia economically, despite the dominating advances of Indonesia.

<sup>13</sup>Chua, D. W. (2015, March 16). Konfrontasi: Why It Still Matters to Singapore. Retrieved from RSIS: <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/CO15054.pdf>

<sup>14</sup>Boey, D. (2014, February 8). KRI Usman Harun not welcome in Singapore waters. Retrieved from The Straits Times: <https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/kri-usman-harun-not-welcome-in-singapore-waters-0>

<sup>15</sup>Leifer, M., & Nelson, D. (1973, April 1). Conflict of Interest in the Straits of Malacca. *International Affairs*, pp. 190-203. Retrieved from Oxford Academic: <https://doi.org/10.2307/2614043>





In spite of these differences, both the Indonesians and us reacted to the expanding Chinese communist influence, due to the fall of Saigon and subsequently Laos and Cambodia, with an uneasy cooperation as an attempt to safeguard the region from the influence of China.

### *Mutual Cooperation*

Over time, ties were normalised slowly in the interest of our region. Indonesia had opened up to us economically in hopes of boosting its economic growth while we were finally able to establish ties with Indonesia, thereby disincentivizing Indonesia from taking any actions against Singapore for fear of loss of investments and potential economic growth.

We also agreed to coordinate with Indonesia in developing ties with Communist China, agreeing only to establish diplomatic ties after the latter had done so. This had helped to further rapport with one another and allowed further easing of tension between both nations.

However, following Indonesia's occupation of East Timor, we were the only Southeast Asian nation that voted to abstain in a United Nations resolution on the military action due to the general nature of the action being a threat to international security. Our ambassador in Indonesia noted that this had caused the ire of Jakarta, which had taken several economic and diplomatic actions in response to what it



perceived to be a betrayal by Singapore. It took significant diplomatic effort to bridge the rift between both sides over the matter.




BRIEF ON MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE RELATIONS

*Pictured: PM meeting with Tun Dr Mahathir*

*Intertwined Nations*

PMO notes that it goes without saying that there is emotional baggage left over between us and Malaysia. The differences between race and UMNO's insistence on moving towards 'Bumiputra' policies rather than creating a Malaysian Malaysia was the death nail of the previous cabinet's aim of merger.




Pictured: view of Johor from Singapore in the 1990s<sup>16</sup>

The other factor for the tense relation between the our two nations is our dependence on Malaysia for basic necessities such as water and even food. With the lack of any form of hinterland, we have to rely on Malaysia to adhere to its international agreements, including the 1962 Water Agreement.

Other factors PMO would like to highlight is the domestic situation in Malaysia, like Indonesia, the public can be stirred up by racial tension. It is not uncommon for the ruling party, UMNO, to caricature Singapore as a Chinese-centric, rather than a multi-racial, state. As such, they often tap on internal domestic anger outwards towards Singapore.

<sup>16</sup>Roots.sg. (n.d.). National Collection. Retrieved from Roots.sg:  
<https://roots.sg/learn/collections/list?colcat=bc0df9e9d0dc458295c5334e3ed05829&page=168>





But the most important consideration for members of the Cabinet, is that unlike Jakarta, Malaysia's proximity makes military action a constant realistic option.

### *Collaboration and Sabre Rattling*

PMO notes the current stance of our government, as has been the stance for years, that Malaysia is not our natural enemy. PMO notes the various forms of cooperation, including the Five Powers Defence Agreement. Moreover, it would be foolish to not tap on both the Malaysian and Indonesian economy.,

Our policies to connect our economies, has been a means to deter Malaysia from attacking us Singapore had proposed various methods to support Malaysia's economic growth, mostly in the form of providing investments and technical expertise. One of the initiatives was the Common Market between Malaysia and Singapore. However, even our economic proposals cause the ire of KL, with our Ambassador receiving complaints over Malaysians CPF returns.

That being said PMO notes that there were occasions in which Malaysia had attempted to reassert itself. This came to ahead when Tun Dr Mahathir Bin Mohamad, then Prime Minister of Malaysia, decided to press Singapore over the bilateral agreement on water. In response, PM Lee Kuan Yew responded sharply, stating that he would not hesitate to take military action if the water agreement was not upheld. Another such case of tensions between both nations was the territorial dispute over Pedra Branca in 1980, one which was still ongoing until the crisis.

However, overall both sides had a tacit agreement that while they may hold resentment towards one another, it was in their interests to cooperate so that both sides can benefit more than if they had operated independently.

### POTENTIAL AGENDA ITEMS FOR THE CABINET

PMO has distilled several potential agenda items for the emergency cabinet meeting. These goals are all in accordance with the main aim of preserving the independence and sovereignty of Singapore.

#### Socio-Economic Impacts of Decisions taken by the Committee on the Singapore Public

At the current moment, PMO understands that none of the ministries have made the information known to the public. However, should any public declaration be made, it will certainly have an impact on the Singapore society as a whole.

Moreover, if the cabinet deems that military options are to be exercised, it would involve the mobilisation of armed forces, which can heavily impact Singapore's economy, given that Singapore's military is based on conscription, especially in the event of prolonged conflict.

**PMO reminds cabinet members to refer to the Standard Operating Practice, with regard to mobilisation and the limits of directives.**

### Diplomatic Relations with Other Nations

While we have been having rocky relationships with our neighbours, we have always attempted to develop an international image that emphasises collaboration with other nations while safeguarding our sovereignty. Unfortunately, given the events leading up to this emergency, the cabinet may have to face the possibility that the two objectives of our foreign policy may come into conflict with one another.

### Extent of Singapore's Military Capabilities

Historically, we have emulated that emulated Switzerland's defence doctrine, in which we would have an armed forces specifically designed for the defence of the nation, inflicting as much casualty and damage on the aggressors as possible.

Since the easing of tensions with Malaysia and Indonesia the SAF had conducted joint military exercises with the two neighbours and as the former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew said, "established channels of communications which enabled us to keep a cool exchange going".<sup>17</sup>


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<sup>17</sup> Lee, K. (1987, July 2). SPEECH BY PRIME MINISTER LEE KUAN YEW AT THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES DAY DINNER HELD AT ISTANA ON THURSDAY, 2 JULY 1987. Retrieved from National Archives of Singapore: <http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/lky19870702.pdf>




Pictured: Soldiers from Operation Nightingale, part of our efforts to contribute to the UN mission in Kuwait

Moreover, it also assumes that the international community would come to its aid in a swift manner.



Pictured: a rough approximation of the Mersing Line. The line runs from Mersing to Muar and was used by the British as a form of counter Attack into Malaya.





A pre-emptive offensive strike in the hopes of preventing its opponents from inflicting any harm on Singapore. Such a doctrine would entail a strategic strike against our adversaries, sabotaging their defence infrastructure such as roads, ammunition dumps, and command posts.<sup>18</sup> Our cabinet can tap on British plans during the Second World War, including the **Mersing Line**, which would secure the crucial water supplies of Johor.

### Extent of Support from the International Community to a Hypothetical Invasion

The recent **invasion of Kuwait** served as a wakeup call for us. It took the international community. **The time between the invasion of Kuwait and military intervention by the international community was 168 days.** International support should be considered carefully before being implemented.

We managed to further secure our international partners when we signed a memorandum of understanding to allow the US to use the facilities of the Paya Lebar Air Base and Sembawang Naval Base, further strengthening US-Singapore defence relations and deterring foreign nations to attack Singapore. In another speech in 1966, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew argued that if Singapore was to survive in a world of “big fish” consuming “small shrimp”, Singapore would have to be a “poisonous shrimp”.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup>Seah, J. H. (2016, February 29). The Case for Pre-Emptive Warfare and its Implications for Singapore. Retrieved from MINDEF: [https://www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/safty/pointer/documents/pdf/V42N1\\_Pre-Emptive\\_Warfare.pdf](https://www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/safty/pointer/documents/pdf/V42N1_Pre-Emptive_Warfare.pdf)

<sup>19</sup>Lee, K. (1966, June 22). Transcript of a talk given by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, on the subject "Big and Small Fishes in Asian Waters". Retrieved from National Archives of Singapore: <http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/lky19660615.pdf>



Pictured: Israeli soldiers during the Six-Day War.

The war started with a preemptive strike by Israel against her neighbours. However, this action worsened its standing within the international community. In effect, a pre-emptive strike would be a risky gamble.

Moreover, striking first relies heavily on the precise analysis of Indonesian and Malaysian intentions. Misjudgements on the part of the cabinet may could potentially result in either a battle of attrition, that Singapore is ill-suited for, or international condemnation given our appearance as aggressors in the conflict. **It would be up to the Cabinet to determine the best way to gain more information.**

## Conclusion

The Cabinet, as the government, must defend Singapore's sovereignty. It is faced with many challenges and has to slowly decide what is going on, and how do we respond to it. PMO advises the cabinet to tread carefully and prevent and escalation to war. All the best.

## Disclaimer:

The Academics Team at NTUMUN 2019 notes that information in this guide is to serve an educational and academic purposes. It does not purport to be issuing an actual cabinet paper or reports from ministries. Any information provided is for the purpose of simulating the Crisis. Any uncited information is for academic purposes and does not purport to know the actual knowledge of capabilities at the time.

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